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What a frightening thing is the human, a mass of gauges
and dials and registers, and we can read only a few and
1
those perhaps not accurately.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Charging someone with a felony-level assault is not akin to
sticking a toe in the water; it is a dive from a significant height. A
prosecutor’s irrevocable decision to commence such a serious case
against an individual will be the paramount, most consequential
choice in its litigation. With that said, all but the most strident
adversary would stipulate that, while considering whether to
proceed with a criminal complaint, prosecutors are simultaneously
2
“minister[s] of justice,” lawyers, and human beings. In occupying
these three roles, prosecutors are constrained by their best reading
3
4
of the criminal code, guided by their principles of ethics, and
inevitably subject to the creeping dynamics of culture. It should be
no surprise, then, that, as a prosecutor sits down with a set of police
reports to consider whether to charge a person with a violent
crime, three questions inevitably spring to mind: “Did it happen?
Can I prove it? How will others evaluate my decision?” These
questions compel prosecutors to decide: to choose whether to
produce a criminal complaint that, in addition to being the
documentation of a crime, is a sort of script for a legal
Gesamtkunstwerk, the generation of which is part mathematics, part
divination, and part cultural expression. This article focuses on a
problem that occasionally arises when considering the
1. JOHN STEINBECK, THE WINTER OF OUR DISCONTENT 88 (1961).
2. State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 798 (Minn. 2000) (citations omitted).
3. See MINN. STAT. § 609.01 (2012) (“[Minnesota Statutes chapter 609] shall
be construed according to the fair import of its terms, to promote justice, and to
effect its purposes which are declared to be . . . to protect the individual against
the misuse of the criminal law by fairly defining the acts and omissions
prohibited . . . .”).
4. See generally, e.g., MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2011).
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“mathematics” of charging felony-level assault cases in Minnesota.
Generating a complaint is “mathematical” in the
straightforward sense that a prosecutor must identify alleged
conduct that adds up to meet the elements of the charged
5
offense(s). It is “divination” in the sense that a prosecutor must
judge that certain witnesses are telling the truth, that they would
testify consistently at trial, and that a group of fair-minded jurors
6
would believe them. And it is unmistakably “cultural expression,”
as charging decisions do not occur in a void but rather inside
several Matryoshka-doll-like communities that impart norms and
shepherd natural human emotions, from a desire to enact justice
and enforce the rights of the public to a prosecutor’s fear of
embarrassment, disrepute, and failure.
Usually, the mathematics of charging a case is the easiest
aspect to consider because most of the elements of most crimes are
objective and unambiguous. It is the part of the mental process
that requires little emotion, like measuring the dimensions of a
room. Indeed, that was a significant goal in the “element analysis”
7
approach of the Model Penal Code (MPC), which greatly
8
influenced the drafters of Minnesota’s 1963 Code. In a typical
case, once a read-through of a set of police reports illuminates who
did what, when, where, and to whom, a prosecutor can consider
whether the alleged conduct—abstracted from all other case
dynamics—at least fits the elements of some potential charge and
then move on to further, more “practical” considerations, where
other aspects of a prosecutor’s experience, passion, and
idiosyncratic standards may play a role in the ultimate charging
decision.
In Minnesota, however, the mathematical aspect of charging
felony-level assault cases is complicated by a lack of clarity in how
we define the crimes, specifically the definitions of two pertinent
terms: “substantial bodily harm” and “great bodily harm,” which are
5. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 2.01 (“The complaint is a written signed statement
of the facts establishing probable cause to believe that the charged offense has
been committed and that the defendant committed it . . . .”).
6. MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2011) (“The prosecutor in
criminal case shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor
knows is not supported by probable cause . . . .”).
7. PAUL H. ROBINSON & MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
MODEL PENAL CODE 12 (1999) (citing Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element
Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983)), available at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf.
8. Id. at 5; see also infra Part III.C.
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the distinguishing elements to the felony offenses of assault in the
third degree and assault in the first degree, respectively. Because
these terms lack clarity, the ships can become unmoored, and
prosecutors tend to develop disparate, subjective “working
definitions” of the terms, which can produce different charging
thresholds, unequal treatment of similarly-situated suspects, and
hence injustice.
It does not have to be this way. To reduce the potential for
this type of injustice, the Minnesota legislature should refine the
9
definitions of “substantial bodily harm” and “great bodily harm.”
By refining these definitions, the legislature could make
prosecutors’ charging decisions in assault cases much more
objective and consequently easier, fairer, and more just. This
article proposes that the Minnesota legislature adopt the definition
of “substantial bodily harm” found in the Wisconsin Criminal Code
and amend the definition of “great bodily harm” to increase
specificity to what types of injuries are covered by the term.
The article first will discuss the current assault-statute regime
in Minnesota and its origin and development. Then, the article will
identify appellate decisions that have examined the concepts of
bodily harm, substantial bodily harm, and great bodily harm.
Following this, the article will describe the Wisconsin assault-statute
regime. Lastly, the article will propose how Minnesota should
improve.
II. DEGREES OF ASSAULT, GENERALLY DEFINED
In Minnesota, a person commits an assault if he
10
“intentional[ly] inflict[s] . . . bodily harm upon another.” There
11
are five degrees of assault. The degrees of assault at issue in this
article are assault in the fifth degree, assault in the third degree,
and assault in the first degree; these are the degrees of assault that
differ only in regard to the seriousness of the harm suffered by the
12
victim. The other two degrees of assault are not distinguishable
9. See MINN. STAT. § 609.221 (2012) (defining assault in the first degree); id.
§ 609.223 (defining assault in the third degree); id. § 609.224 (defining assault in
the fifth degree).
10. Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 10.
11. See id. §§ 609.221–.224.
12. See id. § 609.221 (defining assault in the first degree); id. § 609.223
(defining assault in the third degree); id. § 609.224 (defining assault in the fifth
degree). Of course, there are several types of assault in the fifth degree, including
acts committed “with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily harm or
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13

by the seriousness of harm suffered by the victim.
A quick glance at assault in the fifth, third, and first degrees
illuminates that the differences between the three, most
significantly the potential punishment upon conviction, are vast.
Assault in the fifth degree requires only that the victim suffer
14
some “bodily harm,” broadly defined as “physical pain or injury,
15
illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” In almost all
circumstances, assault in the fifth degree is a misdemeanor
16
17
offense, punishable by up to ninety days in jail.
Assault in the third degree requires that the victim suffer
18
“substantial bodily harm,” defined as “bodily injury which involves
a temporary but substantial disfigurement, or which causes a
temporary but substantial loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily
19
member.”
The most significant feature of assault in the third
degree, distinguishing it from assault in the fifth degree, is that it is
20
a felony offense, punishable by up to five years in prison and
carrying all of the immediate and collateral consequences that a
21
felony conviction entails. If a defendant has no criminal history,
death.” See id. § 609.224, subdiv. 1(1) (emphasis added). However, this article
discusses only the type of assault in the fifth degree that inflicts actual bodily harm.
13. See id. § 609.2231 (defining types of assault in the fourth degree primarily
by the identity of the victim (e.g., police officers and ambulance drivers)); id.
§ 609.222 (defining assault in the second degree as an assault with a dangerous
weapon). One caveat is that the legislature provided a separate subdivision and
assigned a greater maximum sentence for assaults in the second degree which
result in substantial bodily harm. See id. § 609.222, subdiv. 2.
14. Id. § 609.224, subdiv. 1.
15. Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 7.
16. Id. § 609.224, subdiv. 1. If a defendant has one or more convictions or
adjudications for “qualified domestic violence-related offense[s],” a prosecutor
may be able to charge assault in the fifth degree as a gross misdemeanor or felony,
but neither enhancement would be based on the seriousness of the harm suffered
by the victim. See id. § 609.224, subdiv. 2, 4.
17. Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 3. Please note that, throughout this article, the
terms “punishment” and “sentencing” refer only to periods of executed or stayed
incarceration, not the imposition of fines.
18. Id. § 609.223, subdiv. 1.
19. Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 7a.
20. Id. § 609.223, subdiv. 1.
21. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (“The following persons shall not be
entitled or permitted to vote at any election in this state: . . . a person who has
been convicted of treason or felony, unless restored of civil rights . . . .”); Sames v.
State, 805 N.W.2d 565, 567–70 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (discussing the distinction
between direct consequences and collateral consequences when determining
whether a guilty plea is valid or invalid).
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the presumptive sentence in the case is a year and a day, execution
22
of which is stayed, and, upon conviction, a defendant typically
23
receives a probationary sentence. If a defendant has a criminalhistory score of four, however, the presumptive sentence is an
24
executed sentence of twenty-four months.
Assault in the first degree requires that the victim suffer “great
25
bodily harm,” defined as “bodily injury which creates a high
probability of death, or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or
26
other serious bodily harm.” Assault in the first degree is a felony
27
offense, punishable up to twenty years in prison. If a defendant
has no criminal history, the presumptive sentence in the case is an
28
If a defendant has a
executed sentence of eighty-six months.
criminal-history score of four, the presumptive sentence is an
29
executed sentence of 134 months.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF ASSAULT STATUTES UNDER THE CRIMINAL
CODE IN MINNESOTA
A.

Model Penal Code

This article will delve into a discussion of the current assaultoffense regime in Part IV, but it is helpful to develop a historical
perspective on its origins. After years of development, the
American Law Institute promulgated the MPC in 1962. In the
MPC, there was only a misdemeanor-level assault offense titled
“simple assault” and two felony-level assault offenses titled
30
“aggravated assault.” The misdemeanor offense was premised on
31
the defendant causing mere “bodily injury to another.” The two
22. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2 (2012) (defining assault in the third
degree as a level IV felony).
23. MINN. STAT. § 609.135; MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.
24. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2.
25. MINN. STAT. § 609.221, subdiv. 1.
26. Id. § 609.02, subdiv. 8.
27. Id. § 609.221, subdiv. 1.
28. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4, subdiv. A (defining assault in the first
degree as a level IX felony).
29. Id.
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
31. Id. § 211.1(1). It should be noted that the MPC also allows for a simple
assault to be sentenced as a “petty misdemeanor” if the assault was committed “in a
fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent.” Id.
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felony offenses were premised on causing “serious bodily injury to
32
another” and use of a “deadly weapon,” respectively.
One acquainted with Minnesota law would find the MPC’s
definitions of “bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” quite
familiar. The MPC defines “bodily injury” as “physical pain, illness
33
or any impairment of physical condition.”
The authors of the
MPC explain that the definition of “bodily injury” was taken
directly from the then-current Wisconsin statute, section 939.22(4),
which defined “bodily harm” to mean “physical pain or injury,
34
illness, or any impairment of physical condition.”
The MPC’s
authors explain that defining “bodily injury” in this manner had
two major benefits: First, it thus referred to more than the
consequences of a direct attack by including instances of “pain,
illness, or physical impairment caused indirectly, as, for example,
by exposing another to inclement weather or by non-therapeutic
35
administration of a drug or narcotic.” Second, it excluded from
liability under the assault offense “wrongs based solely upon insult
36
or emotional trauma,” which the authors felt could be punished
37
under other penal rationales.
As for “serious bodily injury,” it was defined as “bodily injury
which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious,
permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the
38
function of any bodily member or organ.”
Spread out
categorically, the MPC’s definition of “serious bodily injury”
essentially is a list of three types of injuries:
1. Injury which creates a substantial risk of death;
32. Id. § 211.1(2). Interestingly, the MPC authors directly rejected enacting
a statute analogous to Minnesota’s assault in the fourth degree, noting that “the
Model Code departs from prior statutory law in dispensing with grading based on
the status of the victim, for example, as a public official.” Id. § 211.1 cmt. 1(c).
The authors held that “[s]pecial provision is unnecessary in view of the ample
severity of penalties against murder and all serious attacks upon the person,
regardless of the identity of the victim.” Id.
33. Id. § 210.0(2). It should be noted that, in providing the definitions of
“bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury,” the MPC adds the caveat “unless a
different meaning plainly is required.” Id. § 210.0.
34. Id. § 211.1 cmt. 3 (citing WIS. STAT. § 939.22(4) (1961)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 188; see also id. § 211.1 cmt. 2 at 185 (noting that certain types of
“offensive contact” should be punished, such as “indecent sexual advance,”
“unwanted erotic touching,” “disorderly conduct,” and “harassment,” for which
the MPC did indeed develop offenses that addressed this conduct directly).
38. Id. § 210.0(3).
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2. Injury which causes serious permanent disfigurement; or
3. Injury which causes protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.
B.

Influence of Wisconsin Statutes

As for the origins of “great bodily harm,” the MPC’s authors
39
again indicate that they looked to the Wisconsin statutes, which
defined “great bodily harm” to mean “bodily injury which creates a
high probability of death, or which causes serious permanent
disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or
40
other serious bodily injury.”
The authors indicate that they
favored the Wisconsin language because it “encompasse[d] the
drastic harms covered under the common-law felony of mayhem
and add[ed] a residual category of harm creating substantial risk of
41
death.” The language of the Wisconsin statute is quite similar to
the ultimate MPC definitions except that, for reasons entirely
unexplained in the MPC comments, the authors dropped the
definition’s catch-all class of harm called “other serious bodily
harm.”
C.

The Model Penal Code’s Influence on Minnesota

Minnesota was one of the first states to reform its criminal
code following promulgation of the MPC, enacting the Minnesota
42
Criminal Code in 1963. As a child of the MPC, it should be no
surprise that the 1963 Minnesota Code’s three categories of assault
have their origin in the MPC. At that time, following the MPC, the
Minnesota legislature distinguished between only three types of
43
assault. The first type simply was called “assault” under section
609.22 of the 1963 Code, the definition of which is identical to the
44
current definition of “assault” and the punishment of which is
identical to the current punishment of misdemeanor-level assault
39. Id. § 211.1 cmt. 3 at n.61.
40. WIS. STAT. § 939.22(14) (1961).
41. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 cmt. 3 at 188.
42. Criminal Code of 1963, ch. 753, 1963 Minn. Laws 1185 (first codified in
1965 at MINN. STAT. ch. 609 (1965)).
43. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1, with MINN. STAT. §§ 609.22–.225
(1965).
44. Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.22 (1965), with MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv.
10 (2012).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/4

8

Larson: Escape from the Twilight Zone: Minnesota's Definitions of Substan

1522

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:5

45

in the fifth degree, up to ninety days in jail. The other two types
were felony offenses called “aggravated assault” under section
609.225 of the 1963 Code. The second type of assault required that
the victim suffer “great bodily harm,” the definition of which is
46
identical to how it currently is defined, and was punishable by up
47
to ten years in prison. The third type required that the defendant
48
commit the assault “with a dangerous weapon,” the forerunner to
49
the current offense of assault in the second degree, and was
punishable by up to five years in prison. Of course, when it came
to sentencing, in a time before the Minnesota Sentencing
50
Guidelines and Blakely, the district court had much more
51
sentencing discretion than it does today. Most notably in the 1963
Minnesota Criminal Code, there was no “intermediate” degree of
assault, such as the current assault in the third degree, to split the
wide gulf between assaults that cause negligible bodily harm and
those that just about kill the victim.
Juxtaposing the MPC’s definition of “serious bodily injury”
with the Minnesota Code’s “great bodily harm” reveals that they are
largely identical, with the differences being that the Minnesota
Code replaces the phrase “substantial risk of death” with “high
probability of death,” adds the adjective “permanent” to the phrase
“protracted loss or impairment of the function,” and supplements
the definition with a catch-all class of harm called “other serious
bodily harm.” Thus, spread out categorically, the Minnesota
Code’s definition of “great bodily harm” is a list of four types of
injuries:
1. Injury which creates a high probability of death;
2. Injury which causes serious permanent disfigurement;
3. Injury which causes a permanent or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ;
and
4. Other serious bodily harm.

45. Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.22 (1965), with MINN. STAT. § 609.224, subdiv.
1 (2012).
46. Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 8 (1965), with MINN. STAT.
§ 609.02, subdiv. 8 (2012).
47. MINN. STAT. § 609.225, subdiv. 1 (1965).
48. Id. § 609.225, subdiv. 2.
49. MINN. STAT. § 609.222 (2012).
50. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (requiring a jury
determination for an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines).
51. See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.10, .135 (1965).
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In other words, while largely adopting the MPC’s assault-statute
regime in 1963, when choosing the definitions of the severities of
harm, Minnesota chose to adopt the exact wording of the Wisconsin
statutes rather than the MPC’s innovations.
Conspicuously,
Minnesota chose to retain Wisconsin’s catch-all “other serious
bodily harm,” while the MPC dropped it.
The MPC and the resulting 1963 Minnesota Code are
extraordinary in many ways, but, to a practitioner who works within
the current assault-offense regime, it can be surprising, perhaps
quaint, that neither code contains a concept analogous to
“substantial bodily harm” or seems to address the “middle range” of
bodily harm that often results from assaultive conduct. Indeed, to
modern ears, it may seem strange, if not downright unjust, to hear
that, from 1963 to 1979, a defendant in Minnesota could break a
victim’s arm, knock him unconscious, or render him temporarily
wheelchair-bound but receive only a misdemeanor conviction. When
seeing these sorts of injuries, a contemporary prosecutor might say,
“This defendant may not need to go to prison, but it definitely was
felony-level conduct.” Not so, a generation ago . . .
D.

Rationale of the MPC

The absence of “substantial bodily harm” or any analogous
concept from the MPC or Minnesota’s 1963 Code may suggest that
there was a large “donut hole” of bodily harms that were not
addressed, or treated appropriately, by the code’s authors.
However, the MPC’s authors certainly were not oblivious to the
need to address the wide variety of human experience and the
“intermediate” types of bodily harm defined as “substantial bodily
harm.” Indeed, as the authors explain in their notes, one of their
primary concerns was to develop a system that properly graded the
52
wide range and variety of assaultive conduct. The authors stated
that it was “necessary for the Model Code to deal separately with
conduct ranging from the simple assault to the infliction of serious,
53
54
permanent injury” (i.e., “bodily injury short of homicide”). It
also is clear that, when the authors were referring to “deal[ing]
with” the range of assaultive behavior, they were referring to the

52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211, introductory note (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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“grad[ing]” of assaultive conduct “ranging from a petty
55
misdemeanor to a felony of the second degree.”
Indeed, in comment 1(c) to MPC section 211.1, the authors
explain that a problem at common law that they sought to address
through the code was that “[a]ttacks resulting in injuries that fell
56
short of mayhem” were treated as “ordinary batteries,” meaning
low-level misdemeanors. The authors explained that the lack of
defined intermediate offenses required common law judges to
exercise discretion in affixing proper punishment to more serious
57
harms.
However, as “the practice developed” to limit the
potential punishments for misdemeanors, legislatures were
compelled to “respond[] by creating a series of intermediate
58
offenses” to bridge the gap between “trivial[ly] sanction[ed]”
minor assaults and “drastic[ally] penal[ized] . . . offenses such as
59
murder and rape.”
The MPC authors followed that trend,
explaining that the adoption of a system of “laws that grade various
manifestations of causing . . . injury” was a “necessary part of a
60
penal code.” The MPC thus implemented the system previously
described, explaining that their grading of assault offenses was
“rationalized according to the gravity of harm intended or caused
and the dangerousness of the means used” and designed to provide
commensurate penalties ranging from a “maximum term of only 30
61
days” to a “maximum of 10 years.”
Even with this attention on the need to grade assault offenses
appropriately, when it came to establishing grades of physical harm
(short of death), the MPC defined only two, and it is clear that the
authors felt that two was enough and that, despite the existence of
other model statutory regimes that contained three grades of
62
physical harm, a regime that had only two grades, along with the
55. Id.
56. Id. § 211.1 cmt. 1(c).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 181. For example, the authors noted that “New York created four
levels of offenses: maiming (15 years), assault with a deadly weapon or a
destructive or noxious thing (10 years), inflicting grievous bodily harm or assault
with any weapon (five years), and simple assault or battery (one year).” Id. (citing
N.Y. §§ 240–245, 1400 (repealed 1967)).
60. Id. at 183.
61. Id. § 211.1 cmt. 2 at 184.
62. See id. at 185–86 (describing the “proposed federal criminal code . . . .
[that] intergrat[ed] all forms of assaultive behavior in a single provision . . . [and]
define[d] separate offenses of maiming, aggravated battery, and battery”); id.
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flexibility of sentencing discretion, was “appropriate” and allowed
63
for “very broad coverage.” In the MPC comments, the authors are
wholly and curiously silent on whether a level of harm in between
“bodily injury” and “serious bodily injury” was considered and, if so,
64
why it was rejected.
E.

Changes to Minnesota’s Assault Statutes

After the enactment of the Minnesota Criminal Code, sixteen
years passed without any changes to the assault-statute regime. In
1979, the code was substantially amended to create a new four65
degree regime, evidencing perhaps that the legislature found the
need for an intermediate felony-level assault. What was formerly
called “aggravated assault” and defined under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.225, subdivision 1 (1965), was recast as “assault in the
first degree” and moved to section 609.221 (1979). Its ten year
66
maximum penalty and the definition of “substantial bodily harm”
67
remained unchanged.
The other type of felony-level assault, pertaining to an assault
with a dangerous weapon under Minnesota Statutes section
§ 211.1 cmt. 1(c) (describing the then-current New York Statutes sections 240–45
that defined separate levels of punishment for (1) maiming, (2) inflicting grievous
bodily harm or assault, and (3) simple assault or battery).
63. Id. § 211.1 cmt. 3.
64. In addition to the authors’ direct description of the MPC assault regime
as “appropriate” and “very broad,” the tenor of the comments indicate that the
goal of the code was to promote enough flexibility to fairly address the variety of
assaultive behavior. See id. § 211.1 cmt. 1, at 174. For example, the authors noted
that some states had statutes distinguishing assaults on special types of victims, see
id. § 211.1 cmt. 2, at 185, as Minnesota’s current assault in the fourth degree does.
The authors then directly addressed that the MPC did not enact an assault offense
related to the status of the victim, stating that “[s]pecial provision is unnecessary in
view of the ample severity of penalties against murder and all serious attacks upon
the person, regardless of the identity of the victim.” Id. This comment suggests a
degree of confidence that the MPC provided flexibility to assign an offense name
and an appropriate penalty to any assault. It’s easy to cut the MPC authors a
break, given their enormous feat of collecting, summarizing, and taking the best
of the common law and various state statutes at the time to create the code. But it
is apparent that the authors felt that, if there was any need for an “intermediate”
crime, it was to fill the space between mere “simple assault” and homicide and that
they did not see a need for and were not concerned with creating a crime that was
“intermediate” to assault and aggravated assault. Obviously, in 1963, the
Minnesota legislature agreed with the MPC and passed its code.
65. See Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 258, secs. 4–7, §§ 609.221–.224, 1979 Minn.
Laws 548, 549–50.
66. See id. sec. 4, § 609.221, 1979 Minn. Laws at 550.
67. See id. sec. 2, § 609.02, subdiv. 7a, 1979 Minn. Laws at 549.
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609.225, subdivision 2 (1965), was recast “assault in the second
degree” and moved to section 609.222 (1979). Its penalty also
68
remained the same.
As for the misdemeanor-level assault found in the 1963 Code,
which had been labeled simply “assault” under Minnesota Statutes
section 609.22 (1965), it was recast as “assault in the fourth degree”
and relocated to section 609.224 (1979), but it otherwise remained
69
the same.
What was new in the 1979 Code was remarkable: the creation
of a new felony offense that bridged the gulf between the former
“assault” and “aggravated assault,” assault in the third degree under
Minnesota Statutes section 609.223 (1979). Assault in the third
degree was defined then, as it is now, as an assault that “inflicts
70
substantial bodily harm.”
“Substantial bodily harm” also was
71
defined then as it is now.
As one might expect for this
intermediate-level assault, the legislature set its maximum penalty
72
at three years in prison.
It is evident that the definition of “substantial bodily harm,”
like “great bodily harm,” is just a sub-list of types of injuries. Spread
out categorically, the Minnesota Code’s definition of “substantial
bodily harm” is a list of three types of injuries:
1. Injury which involves a temporary but substantial
disfigurement;
2. Injury which causes a temporary but substantial loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ;
and
73
3. Injury which causes a fracture of any bodily member.
Beyond these words, however, the legislature provided no
additional definitions to assist prosecutors in determining what
specific injuries fall within these types. All further interpretation
and elaboration had to be performed by prosecutors on an ad hoc
74
basis and by the appellate courts on a post hoc basis.
68. See id. sec. 5, § 609.222, 1979 Minn. Laws at 550.
69. See id. sec. 7, § 609.224, 1979 Minn. Laws at 550.
70. See id. sec. 6, § 609.223, 1979 Minn. Laws at 550.
71. Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 7a (Supp. 1979), with MINN. STAT.
§ 609.02, subdiv. 7a (2012).
72. MINN. STAT. § 609.223 (Supp. 1979).
73. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 7a (1979).
74. Since 1979, this three-tiered gradation in the assault-statute regime has
remained wholly intact and unmodified by the legislature. That is not to say that
the legislature has not amended the regime in a number of noteworthy ways,
including recasting misdemeanor-level assault as “assault in the fifth degree,”
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IV. APPELLATE ELABORATION ON THE LEVELS OF HARM
When compelled by an appeal, the Minnesota appellate courts
have interpreted, attempted to clarify, and attempted to delineate
the three types of bodily harm.
Almost exclusively, when
addressing one of the types of bodily harm, the issue before the
court is whether the evidence presented at a trial was sufficient to
support the appellant’s conviction. Some decisions have brought
clarity, while other decisions tend to reveal why statutory reform may
be a better mechanism to increase clarity than reliance on
appellate courts reviewing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims
75
following jury verdicts.

MINN. STAT. § 609.224, subdiv. 1 (2012); creating what is now assault in the fourth
degree to protect police officers and other civil servants, id. §§ 609.2231, .221,
subdiv. 2 (providing a separate crime prohibiting use of deadly force against peace
officers and corrections employees); creating other felony offenses under the
“assault in the fourth degree” title to punish assaults motivated by forms of racial
and other bias, id. § 609.2231, subdiv. 4; creating the offense of domestic assault,
id. § 609.2242; creating the concept of using a defendant’s recidivism as a basis for
enhancing misdemeanor-level assaults to gross-misdemeanor-level and felony-level
offenses, id. § 609.2242, subdiv. 2, 4; and creating a second type of assault in the
second degree, id. § 609.222, subdiv. 2.
75. An obvious limitation in obtaining new detail from the appellate courts is
that it is not their role to add new detail in the first place. The canons of statutory
interpretation dictate that “words and phrases are construed according to rules of
grammar and according to their common and approved usage,” id. § 645.08(1),
and the courts have held that, when “the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, [they do] not engage in any further construction and instead
look[] to the plain meaning of the statutory language.” State v. Wukawitz, 662
N.W.2d 517, 525 (Minn. 2003). It is hard for the courts to “gap-fill” statutes with
this limitation.
Another limitation is that, when the courts have been asked to review the
definitions of the types of bodily harm, the standard of review on a sufficiency-ofthe-evidence claim does not easily allow the court to attempt to demarcate clear
lines between the levels of harm. Review of these claims puts the courts in a
posture which requires them to weigh all evidence in favor of the conviction and
show extreme deference to the jury’s verdict. See State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d
466, 477 (Minn. 1999).
Also, from a practitioner’s point of view, relying on direction from
appellate courts is a slow, inefficient way to learn what the legislature intends to
criminalize. Metaphors abound. It’s akin to learning whether the flag will fly by
“running it up the flagpole.” It’s akin to testing the suspension of a car by driving
off a cliff. And, when faced with the interpretative task of applying the reasoning
in sufficiency-of-the-evidence decisions to a new set of facts, it’s far too often akin
to the ancient art of reading tea leaves.
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Bodily Harm

The Minnesota appellate courts have not had to address
“bodily harm” very often since 1963, and when they have, they have
kept their opinions simple and have not diverted from the basic
philosophy of the MPC that some pain or injury must be present, as
76
opposed to mere “offensive contact.” As for specific physical pain
or injury, the courts have not addressed a set of facts that resulted
in distinguishing mere “offensive contact” from “bodily harm.” But
it is clear from cases such as State v. Tscheu that “[o]nly a ‘minimal
amount of physical pain or injury’ is necessary in order ‘to satisfy
77
the definition of bodily harm.’”
The courts have addressed
several cases in which the claimed harm constitutes a victim’s mere
description of pain or a bruise, which the courts have found to be
sufficient evidence of bodily harm. For example, in State v. Johnson,
the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of bodily
78
harm when the victim experienced “pain from being struck.”
Physical pain or injury can be established when a victim subjectively
79
As for
feels pain, even if there are no actual signs of injury.
demonstrable physical injuries, even slight injuries qualify as bodily
harm. In State v. Mattson, the court found sufficient evidence of
80
physical injury based on evidence that the victim suffered a bruise,
76. When designing the MPC’s assault-offense regime, the MPC authors took
note that they sought to depart from prior law by “limiting assault to cases
involving either the fact or prospect of physical injury.” MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 211.1 cmt. 2 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). They explained that
“[m]ere offensive contact is excluded” from the definition of assault. Id. Note,
however, that the authors were well aware that certain types of “offense contact”
should be punished, such as “indecent sexual advance[s],” “unwanted erotic
touching,” “disorderly conduct,” and “harassment,” and did indeed develop
offenses that addressed this conduct directly. Id.
77. 758 N.W.2d 849, 859 (Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d
518, 522 (Minn. 2003)).
78. 277 Minn. 230, 237, 152 N.W.2d 768, 773 (1967); see also State v. Bowser,
307 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Minn. 1981) (holding that evidence that the victim suffered
bodily harm after experiencing physical pain with sexual penetration and
receiving an accompanying laceration that resulted in bleeding was sufficient to
support a finding of bodily harm).
79. Bowser, 307 N.W.2d at 779.
80. 376 N.W.2d 413, 415 (Minn. 1985); see also State v. Nordstrum, 385
N.W.2d 348, 351–52 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (same); State v. Johnson, 392 N.W.2d
357, 357–58 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that evidence that defendant struck
victim in the face, knocking her down and causing her to sustain bruises to her
arm and knee and a bloody knee, was sufficient to support a conviction for assault
in the fifth degree); State v. O’Brien, 352 N.W.2d 130, 131–32 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that evidence that appellant punched victim in the face, causing a
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and in State v. Slaughter, scratches on the victim’s neck constituted
81
bodily harm.
As for the other types of bodily harm, namely “illness” and
“any impairment of physical condition,” the appellate courts have
been asked to interpret these categories of harm in only one case,
82
involving a defendant who drugged a victim. It’s clear from a
review of appellate decisions that few appellants have sought
reversal of conviction based on the lack of evidence of bodily harm,
and there is very little related to this type of harm on which
practitioners trifle.
B.

“Substantial Bodily Harm”

Surprisingly, the appellate courts have not provided much
more guidance on the definition of “substantial bodily harm.” In
fact, in 2003, the court of appeals conceded that “few Minnesota
83
cases specifically define substantial bodily harm.” To review the
decisions that do exist, it seems appropriate to look at each of the
three categories of “substantial bodily harm” separately.

cut, was sufficient to support a conviction for assault in the fifth degree).
81. 691 N.W.2d 70, 76 (Minn. 2005).
82. See Jarvis, 665 N.W.2d at 521. A review of appellate decisions did not
reveal any cases that further defined or discussed “illness,” and, prior to 2003 with
the Jarvis decision, the courts “ha[d] not had occasion to address the type of
evidence needed to support a finding of ‘impairment of physical condition’ as a
type of bodily harm.” Id. In Jarvis, there was evidence that the defendant
provided pills to an unsuspecting female victim, claiming that they were
“vitamins.” Id. at 519. The pills, however, caused her side effects that were not
anticipated by the victim, causing her to become “disoriented,” “groggy,” and
unable to move her body without assistance. Id. at 522. Testimony from a forensic
scientist revealed the presence of barbiturate drugs in the victim’s system after the
incident. Id. at 520. The court reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to
find that the victim suffered “bodily harm.” Id. at 521–22. The court reviewed the
Webster’s definition of “impair” and held that “‘any impairment of physical
condition’ in Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 7, means any injury
that weakens or damages an individual’s physical condition.” Id. at 522 (citing
RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 959 (Wendayln R. Nichols &
Sheryl B. Stebbins eds., 2d ed. 2001)). The court found that the evidence amply
supported a finding that the victim’s physical condition was “weakened or
damaged by an involuntary ingestion of drugs.” Id.
83. State v. Dunn, No. CX-02-872, 2003 WL 282454, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 11, 2003).
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Temporary but Substantial Disfigurement

The first category of injuries, those which would constitute
“temporary but substantial disfigurement,” has been discussed
several times. In 1985, in State v. Carlson, the court of appeals
reviewed a case in which a ten-year-old victim was beaten by her
father and suffered “two black eyes, facial bruises, bruises on her
84
With virtually no
neck and head, and scratches on her arm.”
discussion and no elaboration on the concept of “temporary but
substantial disfigurement,” the court held that these injuries
constituted “substantial bodily harm.” Five years later, though, in
1986, the issue of whether an injury that involved a black eye
constituted substantial bodily harm came up again, and the
demarcation line became fuzzy. In State v. Whaley, the appellant
was convicted of assault in the third degree after punching the
victim in the face, causing the victim to suffer a black eye, a swollen
85
face, and a fractured left cheekbone. In the prosecutor’s closing
argument, the prosecutor argued, “Let’s look at the disfigurement,
first of all. You saw the photos of the victim. This, ladies and
gentlemen, is disfigurement. When you have a black eye and your face
86
is swollen, that is disfigurement.” Defense counsel objected to the
87
prosecutor’s argument, citing it as a misstatement of the law.
Without citing precedent, the court noted that “under Minnesota
law a black eye, in and of itself, does not equate to ‘substantial
88
bodily harm.’”
The inference prompted by the holding, of
course, is that a black eye, in and of itself, is not “temporary but
89
substantial disfigurement.” However, there has never been any
discussion about why that, or any black eye, would never constitute
substantial disfigurement.
The two cases compel the question: Why is a black eye with
accompanying bruises and scratches sufficient evidence to prove
substantial bodily harm when a black eye with accompanying facial
84. 369 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
85. 389 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). Note that the fractured
cheekbone was a sufficient injury to sustain the conviction for assault in the third
degree. Id. at 927. This case is discussed here for the court’s comment on the
black eye.
86. Id. at 926.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. The court nevertheless sustained the conviction, holding that the
fractured cheekbone was a “fracture,” which qualifies as substantial bodily harm.
Id. at 927.
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swelling is insufficient? The word “substantial” has been defined as
90
“considerable size or amount,” but no court has sought to
demarcate why a black eye is distinguishable from other forms of
disfigurement. Can one easily quantify these sorts of facial injuries?
When reviewing a case involving injuries such as bruises, scratches,
and swelling, practitioners essentially are left with the vague
holdings of Carlson and Whaley and left to infer their penumbra and
import in other cases.
The situation seems unnecessarily
91
arbitrary.
Another common type of injury which is discussed under the
concept of “temporary but substantial disfigurement” is a laceration
that requires stitches. Unfortunately, though, the court of appeals
has never addressed whether a laceration that requires stitches
constitutes per se “temporary but substantial disfigurement.”
Moreover, in cases where the court of appeals has reviewed injuries
requiring stitches, the court has chosen to not publish its opinions,
92
offering no precedential guidance to practitioners. For example,
in State v. Wimes, an unpublished case, the court recognized a “large
deep cut” near the victim’s right eyebrow, which was described as a
“1.5-inch, L-shaped laceration” that had to be sutured, as
93
“temporary but substantial disfigurement.” In State v. Smith, an
unpublished case, the court held that a “3-inch bleeding laceration
on [the victim’s] scalp requiring 10–15 staples, along with a
concussion and accompanying amnesia at the time of the assault”
94
established substantial bodily harm. In In re Welfare of A.B.R., an
unpublished case, the court held that a laceration on a victim’s
forearm that was 2.5 inches long, 1 to 1.5 centimeters deep, and
required seven stitches to repair constituted “temporary but
95
substantial disfigurement.”
This series of unpublished cases may endow practitioners with
some confidence in evaluating a laceration that requires stitches,
but certainly there is no published case that holds that a laceration
that is repaired with stitches or sutures constitutes substantial
90. E.g., State v. Williams, 451 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
91. Anecdotally, one way that prosecutors have established that a black eye
constitutes substantial bodily harm is to introduce evidence, when possible, that
the injury to the eye caused temporary but substantial impairment to the victim’s
vision.
92. See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08, subdiv. 3(c) (2012).
93. No. C6-92-1515, 1992 WL 383419, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1992).
94. No. C5-95-2153, 1996 WL 380571, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. July 9, 1996).
95. No. A07-0983, 2007 WL 4564151, at *10 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2007).
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bodily harm. Also, these cases do not provide any sense that
stitches or sutures would be required. Indeed, although stitches
may be some sort of indicator that the laceration has “considerable
size or amount,” the court has never held that medical intervention
96
or evidence is necessary.
2.

Temporary but Substantial Loss or Impairment of the Function of
Any Bodily Member or Organ

The second category, “temporary but substantial loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ,” has
been discussed infrequently by the appellate courts. Even as late as
2001, the court of appeals, in State v. Larkin, had not been asked to
consider whether a loss of consciousness constituted “substantial
97
bodily harm.” In short shrift, however, the court determined (1)
rendering someone unconscious temporarily impairs “a function of
the brain, that is, the ability to receive and interpret sensory
impulses” and (2) because loss of consciousness is a “total”
98
impairment of sensory brain function, it is thus “substantial.”
Thus, the court concluded that “temporary loss of consciousness,
on its own, is substantial bodily harm for the purpose of [assault in
99
the third degree].”
3.

Fracture of Any Bodily Member

The third category, “fracture of any bodily member,” appears
to be the most illuminated type of injury by virtue of several
96. See State v. Dunn, No. CX-02-872, 2003 WL 282454, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 11, 2003). In Dunn, the court refused to overturn a jury’s finding of
substantial bodily harm when the only evidence of injury was a set of photographs
of lacerations on the victim’s face and head and evidence of bleeding at the crime
scene. Id. Of course, Dunn remains an unpublished case with no precedential
value, and the legal issue on appeal was sufficiency of the evidence, requiring the
court to give high deference to the jury and review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the conviction. Id. at *2–4. But, there it is, usable or unusable,
perhaps an opinion on which no judgment (e.g., a charging decision) should rely.
97. 620 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). For the sake of nuance, it is
noteworthy that the supreme court in 1983 opined without discussion, “Arguably,
‘great bodily harm’ is inflicted if one knocks someone out briefly.” State v.
Stafford, 340 N.W.2d 669, 670 (Minn. 1983) (citing State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706
(Minn. 1978)).
98. Larkin, 620 N.W.2d at 337.
99. Id. A noteworthy omission in Larkin is that, although the victim also
suffered a concussion, the court chose to not discuss whether a concussion on its
own could be considered substantial bodily harm, a question that remains
unanswered by the Minnesota appellate courts.
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straightforward statements in several published cases (e.g., State v.
100
Stafford, when the victim’s nose was broken; State v. Wellman, when
101
the victim’s nose and two bones were broken; State v. Witucki,
102
when the victim suffered a broken finger; State v. Whaley, when
103
the victim suffered a fractured cheekbone; and State v. Waino,
104
when the victim’s ribs were cracked ).
The aforementioned cases constitute essentially all of the
appellate case law in Minnesota associated with interpreting the
meaning of “substantial bodily harm.” If a prosecutor reviews a
case involving an injury not specifically discussed in the cases, such
as a burn or a concussion, or an impairment not specifically
discussed, such as the temporary loss of sight due to a black eye or
difficulty chewing due to a sore jaw, then the prosecutor must
simply teach the definition of “substantial bodily harm” to the jury
and argue her cause. Many prosecutors may consider trying a case
on a novel or uncharted theory to be a joyful way to spend one’s
workweek, but, from the perspective of a “minister of justice,” on
the mathematical issue of whether an injury should “count” as
substantial bodily harm, many prosecutors simply want more clarity
in the statute.
C.

“Great Bodily Harm”

In contrast to “bodily harm” and “substantial bodily harm,”
there is more appellate litigation on the various forms of “great
bodily harm,” although it is not clear that more case law has led to
more clarity. In most cases, courts review each category of bodily
105
harm separately, and, in any given case, an injury may satisfy one
category but not another. When dealing with cases involving “great
100. 340 N.W.2d at 670–71.
101. 341 N.W.2d 561, 562–64 (Minn. 1983) (defendant was convicted of three
separate counts of assault in the third degree for three assaults that occurred on
separate occasions).
102. 420 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
103. 389 N.W.2d 919, 927 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
104. 611 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
105. The supreme court has not always followed this practice. See, e.g., State v.
Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 358, 359 (Minn. 1982) (holding that unspecified injuries
that the victim received when the appellant beat him in the head multiple times
with a two-foot-long pipe were sufficient to support the appellant’s conviction of
assault in the first degree); State v. Peters, 274 Minn. 309, 316–17, 143 N.W.2d 832,
837 (1966) (holding that facial injuries suffered by a police officer in a pistolwhipping assault constituted great bodily harm without specifying in detail the
officer’s injuries or the category of great bodily harm the injuries satisfies).
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bodily harm,” it is common to see a case in which a victim’s injuries
qualify under more than one of the four categories (e.g., when a
permanently disfiguring wound also causes a high probability of
106
death).
Sometimes, an appellate court will work deliberately
107
through each category of “great bodily harm;” other times, a
108
court will appear to leave its holding purposely vague.
In many
cases, it seems obvious that the court’s goal is simply to decide the
sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue in the case before it, not to impart
any guidance to practitioners whatsoever. Yet, most practitioners
still will try to rely on the case law that does exist for whatever
guidance and grounding can be inferred.
1.

High Probability of Death

When looking at the first category of “great bodily harm,”
“high probability of death,” the appellate courts have focused on
the fact that the injury itself must be life threatening; the injury
cannot simply be a “near miss.” The courts have noted that,
because the distinguishing characteristic of Minnesota’s assault
statutes is the severity of the victim’s injury, there will be times
when a person who commits a “grievous assault” will escape serious
assault charges simply “because the victim is fortunate enough to
109
escape serious injury.”
It’s a constraint created “by the language
110
of the statute.”
For example, in State v. Gerald, the court considered a half-inch
laceration on the victim’s ear that, according to medical testimony,
111
was very close to a major vein and artery. The State argued that,
if the vein or artery had been cut, the victim could have bled to
death. The appellant was convicted at trial. On appeal, however,
the court reasoned that “[t]he fact that a lesser injury is located
near a major organ or vessel and therefore could have been more
serious is not sufficient to satisfy the statut[ory]” definition of high
106. See, e.g., State v. Felix, 410 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (“This
case did not simply involve one of the factors defining ‘great bodily harm;’ it
involved all of them.”).
107. See, e.g., State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 802–03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
108. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 322 N.W.2d 358, 359 (Minn. 1982).
109. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d at 802–03 (“Although we find it anomalous that an
individual who commits a grievous assault on another may escape a first-degree
assault conviction because the victim is fortunate enough to escape serious injury,
we are constrained by the language of the statute.”).
110. Id. at 803.
111. Id. at 801–02.
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112

probability of death.
Again, a “near miss,” under Gerald, will not
constitute “great bodily harm.” The injury must be a “nearly-killedhim.”
The court, in State v. Anderson, was far clearer about what they
113
would deem to be a qualifying injury. There, the victim suffered
a laceration to his liver, and a physician testified at trial that the
laceration was a “life-threatening” injury and that it was “a serious
injury because if the bleeding does not stop or is not stopped, a
114
person can bleed and die.”
Compared to the other categories of “great bodily harm” and
thanks to the opinions in Gerald and Anderson, the concept of “high
probability of death” probably is workable as is. With the assistance
of medical expertise, it is quite possible for jurors to evaluate
questions regarding “How close to death was the victim?” and “How
urgent was the medical intervention?”
2.

Serious Permanent Disfigurement

When looking at the second category, “serious permanent
disfigurement,” we again see a handful of published cases, and
there are a few curious unpublished cases as well.
Most of the cases pertain to significant lacerations and their
resulting permanent scars. In Anderson, the court held that a jury
could find that a single scar running the length of the victim’s
115
upper body qualified as serious permanent disfigurement.
In
State v. Currie, a 1987 case, the court held that numerous scars on
the backs of child victims from being whipped with an extension
cord supported the conclusion that the defendant inflicted “great
116
bodily harm.”
So, as of 1987, a single long scar on the upper
body or numerous scars on the back were deemed sufficient
evidence of “great bodily harm.”
Moving forward to 1992, when the court was asked to review
the two half-inch scars on the victim’s neck and ear in State v.
Gerald, the court held that they did not “constitute ‘serious
117
permanent disfigurement.’”
The court stated that the two scars
were “relatively small and in areas where they are not particularly
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 802.
See 370 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
Id.
Id.
400 N.W.2d 361, 364–66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
486 N.W.2d at 802 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 8 (1990)).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss5/4

22

Larson: Escape from the Twilight Zone: Minnesota's Definitions of Substan

1536

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:5

noticeable” and added, “the scars are significantly less extensive
118
and pronounced than those [reviewed in Anderson and Currie.]”
The case comparison found in Gerald is somewhat helpful in
identifying the demarcation line of “serious permanent
disfigurement.” As of 1992, one could accept that the scars in
Gerald were not “great bodily harm” because they were smaller than
those in Anderson, fewer than those in Currie, and were less
noticeable, assuming that one does not take into account the
victim’s ability to cover scars with clothing.
But then three years later, in State v. McDaniel, the court of
appeals held that a scar on the victim’s right center chest which was
“two-thirds of an inch long” and a scar on his upper-right neck
which was “six centimeters long” constituted “serious permanent
119
disfigurement.” Contrasting the injuries with those in Gerald, the
court said that the scars on the victim’s body in McDaniel are “larger
120
and prominently located.”
It is unclear from the opinions why
the court believed that a scar on one’s chest or the upper right of
the neck is more “prominently” located than on one’s ear or the
back of one’s neck. It’s also unclear why the court felt that the
three-fourths-inch scar on the victim’s chest in McDaniel was so
profoundly larger than the two one-half-inch scars on the victim in
Gerald. Moreover, there is no indication in any of these cases, and
no reason to believe, that the court ever had an opportunity to see
the injuries in the other cases.
The court of appeals followed McDaniel three years later with
an unpublished decision in State v. Bernal, which involved an assault
with a beer bottle that caused a severe facial laceration and severed
tragus of the ear, which required forty stitches to repair and left a
121
prominent circular scar on the victim’s face. The court appeared
to acknowledge the obvious, that the injuries were more severe
than those present in Gerald, but also acknowledged that the
victim’s injuries were not as severe as the victims’ injuries in Currie
122
or Anderson.
Then, with little analysis, the court stated that the
injuries were “easily comparable” to the injuries in McDaniel and,
on that basis, found sufficient evidence to support the jury

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
534 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
Id.
No. C3-97-535, 1998 WL 15905, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998).
Id. at *4.
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123

verdict. It is difficult, if not impossible, to take stock of McDaniel
and Bernal and get a clear sense of why those injuries are so similar
and why they both constitute serious permanent disfigurement. By
1998, then, the lines of demarcation in this category were getting
fuzzier.
The fuzziness on this issue became even more obvious in 2003
when the court of appeals reviewed the victim’s injuries in State v.
Demers to see whether they were sufficient to sustain a first-degree
124
assault conviction.
The court’s opinion in Demers probably best
reveals that there is no clear indication of what size or how
prominent a wound must be to be considered serious permanent
disfigurement.
In Demers, the female victim was stabbed in the abdomen,
leaving her with two permanent scars on her abdomen above her
125
navel, below her rib cage.
“One scar is one-half to one inch in
length; the other is three inches in length. [The victim] testified
that because of these scars she is embarrassed to wear a two-piece
126
bathing suit or expose her stomach.”
The court cited McDaniel,
Anderson, and Gerald, but there was no discussion of how the court
compared the injuries to the victim in Demers to the injuries of the
other victims. The court simply said, “Depending on her attire,
[the victim]’s scars are visible and fall within the range of those
considered great bodily harm as discussed in case law. We
therefore conclude that the district court did not clearly err in
127
finding that [her] scars constitute great bodily harm.”
If there is an Exhibit No. 1 to prove why waiting for sufficiencyof-the-evidence appellate decisions is a poor way to clarify the
assault statutes, Demers would be it. It strains credulity to believe
that, somehow, the size and prominence of the respective injuries
in Gerald and Demers should lead to amazingly different outcomes,
considering the sentencing drop-off from a conviction for assault in
128
the first degree to a conviction for assault in the third degree.
123. Id. at *5.
124. No. CX-03-297, 2003 WL 22952813, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2003).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Ironically, Gerald is still cited for the proposition that a scar’s seriousness
may depend on its size and location. See, e.g., State v. Moua, No. A11-944, 2012 WL
2505744, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. July 2, 2012) (holding that the victim’s facial scar
was sufficient evidence of “serious permanent disfigurement” because it required a
deep layer of sutures, was bite-shaped, was in a prominent location, and was
noticeable when she testified).
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The juxtaposition could cause a conscientious prosecutor to err on
the side of caution and choose to not charge someone with assault
in the first degree when the injury is somewhere in the
Gerald/Demers/McDaniel range of injuries. One might call the
prosecutor’s caution “lenity” or “prudence,” but, if a defendant is
not being held accountable for an offense that should be—or that
the legislators or the public believe is—a first-degree assault level
harm, then the prosecutor’s caution is another word for “injustice.”
129
And it would be injustice created by the opacity of the statute.
Leaving the difficulties of the laceration and scar cases aside,
in State v. Ali, the court of appeals reviewed a case in which the
130
appellant bit “nearly one inch off the tip of the victim’s finger.”
At trial, the victim’s “treating physician referred to the injury as a
‘partial amputation’ of the victim’s finger starting just above the

129. For the reader’s benefit, it should be noted that the appellate courts have
tried to clarify other, peripheral issues involving scars and “permanent
disfigurement.” First, in State v. Anderson, the appellant argued that the scar was
not “permanent” because the victim could remove (and testified that she was
considering removing) the scar by plastic surgery. 370 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995). The court curtly rejected that argument with no comment, perhaps
implying that medical interventions that could cover the disfigurement should not
be considered when evaluating the injury. Id. Of course, the import of this is very
unclear. For example, what about cases in which a victim’s teeth are knocked out
but then later reinserted by a dentist? Are prosecutors and jurors supposed to
ignore that the teeth are not gone? Or does the dentist’s replacing the teeth
reduce a “permanent loss” to a mere “temporary loss,” perhaps reducing the
seriousness of an assault from an assault in the first degree to an assault in the
third degree?
Second, in In re R.L.A., an unpublished case, the appellant successfully
argued that expert medical testimony was needed to establish whether a facial
laceration requiring over 200 stitches and resulting in extensive scarring
constituted permanent disfigurement. No. CX-87-2331, 1988 WL 56303, *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. June 7, 1988). The court opined that, because the trial took place only
six months since the incident, “[a]lthough easily observable, only an expert could
knowledgeably ascertain the permanence of six-month old scars,” refusing to
believe that a lay person could conclude that such a scar would not go away. Id.
(emphasis added).
Third, courts hold a defendant responsible for any permanent disfiguring
injuries that result from medical intervention following an assault (e.g., surgical
scars left during treatment of other injuries directly received in an assault). State
v. Curry, No. A09-986, 2010 WL 1753267 (Minn. Ct. App. May 4, 2010) (holding
appellant responsible for causing the serious and permanently disfiguring surgical
scar); Anderson, 370 N.W.2d at 706 (same).
130. 752 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
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131

base of the fingernail.”
The court concluded “the loss of the tip
132
of a finger is a ‘serious permanent disfigurement.’”
3.

Serious Permanent or Protracted Loss or Impairment of the
Function of Any Bodily Member or Organ

When looking at the third category, permanent or protracted
loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ,
the appellate courts again have reviewed only a few notable cases.
The infrequency of cases may be because half of the injuries
covered in this category, “loss of . . . any bodily member or organ,”
are so obvious that no appellate attorney would dare raise a claim
that the evidence was insufficient. In other words, there likely
could be little dispute that the loss of a body part such as an arm,
ear, or kidney would not constitute “great bodily harm.” A notable
baseline case did arise in 2008, however, when the court reviewed
State v. Ali, in which the appellant bit off “nearly one inch off the
133
tip of the victim’s finger.”
In a sign that the court will construe
“bodily member” fairly broadly, even though the victim lost only
the part of his finger “just above the base of the fingernail,” the
court held that this loss constituted permanent loss or impairment
134
of the function of a bodily member.
A more interesting type of injury discussed under this category
relates to impairment of bodily functions due to nerve damage.
One can look again to State v. Gerald, in which the state argued that
the lacerations to the victim’s face that caused him to experience a
“tightening or sensation” when he yawned or chewed qualified as a
135
permanent loss or impairment.
The court disagreed, holding
136
that the evidence was insufficient to support such a finding.
In
explaining its decision, the court noted that medical testimony
revealed that the victim’s “ability to perform bodily functions such
137
as hear, chew, eat or breathe were not impaired by the injuries.”
131. Id.
132. Id. (holding that the injury is a “serious permanent disfigurement” or
“‘permanent . . . loss or impairment of the function’ of any bodily member”)
(citing MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 8 (2006)).
133. Id.
134. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 8 (2006)). See also State v.
Stapek, 315 N.W.2d 603, 603 (Minn. 1982) (holding that “permanent damage to
the [victim]’s reproductive organs” constituted “great bodily harm”).
135. State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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So, by 1992, it was clear that, to be a victim under this category of
harm, a victim must experience more than merely a tightening in
his jaw when yawning and eating.
In 2004, in the unpublished State v. Jones case, the court
138
encountered more nerve damage.
The injuries suffered by the
victim in Jones were similar to those found in Gerald, but the court
found them sufficient to prove “protracted and possibly permanent
loss or impairment of his facial nerves” and thus “great bodily
139
harm.”
In Jones, the victim was hit in the head with a baseball
140
bat. Several weeks after the incident, the victim had “dysfunction
of the left frontal branch of his facial nerves” and decreased
141
sensation in his left anterior cheek.
Five months after the
incident, when the trial took place, the victim still experienced
numbness on the left side of his face, loss of sensation on his left
cheek, and difficulty talking, and he could not raise his left
142
eyebrow.
Medical testimony at trial indicated that the victim’s
143
injuries “could take up to two years to heal or may never heal.”
Faced with this set of injuries, the court found that the victim’s
144
injuries satisfied the element of “great bodily harm.”
Beyond nerve damage, the most interesting type of injury
discussed under this category relates to the total loss of a tooth.
Rather than treat tooth loss as a mere “fracture,” the court stated in
State v. Bridgeforth that evidence that a victim lost a tooth in an
145
assault was sufficient to prove “great bodily harm.” That is, rather
than treat a tooth as simply a part of the skeletal system, the court
surmised that, if a nose is a bodily member, as was concluded in
146
State v. Stafford, then a tooth also must be a bodily member.
Indeed, the court then concluded in one sentence: “[T]he loss of a
147
tooth is a permanent loss of the function of a bodily member.”
The Bridgeforth holding is interesting because it has been the
precedent used by practitioners for years in drawing the conclusion
that, if a defendant busts a victim’s tooth out, he is guilty of assault

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

No. A03-782, 2004 WL 1925052, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
357 N.W.2d 393, 394 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. (citing State v. Stafford, 340 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Minn. 1983)).
Id.
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in the first degree. Indeed, it is one of the most common injuries
that can transform what appears to be a one-punch misdemeanorassault case to a full-blown, prison-commit, first-degree assault
148
felony trial.
It must be noted, however, that in 2005, in State v. Moore, the
149
supreme court placed a giant asterisk on the Bridgeforth decision.
Moore was a case involving a first-degree assault conviction arising
150
At trial, the
from an assault in which the victim lost a tooth.
district court followed Bridgeforth and instructed the jury that “the
loss of a tooth is a permanent loss of the function of a bodily
151
member.”
On appeal, the supreme court overturned the
152
conviction, citing an error in the jury instructions. The supreme
court stated that, by instructing the jury in that matter, it removed
the question of whether the loss of a tooth is “great bodily harm”
153
from the jury’s consideration, which was reversible error.
The
supreme court then clarified that Bridgeforth only stands for the
proposition that the loss of a tooth provides sufficient evidence for a
154
first-degree assault conviction. It does not mean that, as a matter
of law, a loss of a tooth is “great bodily harm.” Leaving the factquestion/legal-question issue aside, the dilemma in Moore is
another excellent example of why Minnesota should not be using
sufficiency-of-the-evidence cases to clarify its assault statutes.
Essentially, it leads practitioners to say, “The supreme court has
decided that a loss of a tooth is great bodily harm, but it would be
reversible error to tell jurors that it is. The parties will have to just
argue about it and let the jurors decide that for themselves.” It is
an absurd conundrum, compounded by the thought of the
unfortunate conversation that the prosecutor in Moore would have
had with the victim when explaining why there would have to be a
second trial.

148. Anecdotally, prosecutors often do not charge assaults that cause tooth
loss as first-degree assaults because the presumptive sentence of the offense would
far exceed the prosecutor’s sense of what an appropriate disposition for the
conduct would be.
149. 699 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Minn. 2005).
150. Id. at 736.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 737.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Other Serious Bodily Harm

When looking at the fourth category, “other serious bodily
harm,” the appellate courts have found that very disparate injuries
(or, more accurately, collections of injuries) can satisfy the statute.
The courts have relied on this category as a sort of catch-all
category that allows the affirmation of a conviction through a
finding that “at the very least” a victim’s injuries “fit within the
155
phrase ‘other serious bodily harm.’”
The courts emphasize that,
even if an injury does not fit into the other categories of “great
bodily harm,” for an injury to be considered “other serious bodily
harm,” it must be “in the same kind or class” as the other three
156
categories of injuries stated with particularity in the statute.
There is little discussion on what the “same kind or class” would be
because what the courts have ended up seeing on appeal typically
has not been just a single injury to consider. Instead, the courts
have been confronted with cases involving victims that suffered
numerous injuries which, in themselves, would not be “great bodily
harm” but, taken together, warrant the maximum prosecution of a
first-degree assault charge (and the presumptive prison-commit
sentence that the assault deserves).
In State v. Jones, the supreme court held that there was
sufficient evidence of other serious bodily harm when the victim
was found unconscious, was hospitalized for a week, and suffered
157
numbness, dizziness, and headaches.
On its own, loss of
consciousness is considered substantial bodily harm, but, when it is
accompanied by all of the injuries the victim in Jones suffered, the
court found the collection of injuries to be “great bodily harm.”
Similarly, in State v. Anderson, the court of appeals concluded
that “a lacerated liver, a laceration on her head which required
stitches, bruises, other head injuries which caused lapses of
consciousness, and a long scar running the length of her upper
158
body” would qualify as “other serious bodily harm.”
However, when reviewing the injuries to the victim in Gerald,
which again were just two half-inch lacerations on the head, the
court held that, even if stitches are required to repair the injuries,
159
they would not constitute “great bodily harm.”
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 1978).
State v. Anderson, 370 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
Jones, 266 N.W.2d at 710.
Anderson, 370 N.W.2d at 706.
State v. Gerald, 486 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
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Following Jones, the court in State v. Barner reviewed an assault
in which the evidence revealed:
Defendant in this case hit the victim so hard in the head
that the victim’s head swelled up, making it difficult for
him to eat for three days; defendant inflicted multiple
stab wounds, one 4 inches deep and the rest 2 inches
deep, leaving multiple scars; and defendant injured the
victim’s hand in such a way as to affect the way the victim,
160
an avid canoeist, paddles his canoe.
Rather than proceed with a discussion of each category of
great bodily harm, the court, quoting Jones, wrote, “‘[a]t the very
least’ . . . the injuries ‘fit within the phrase “other serious bodily
161
harm.”‘“
This sort of cursory conclusion, of course, leaves a great deal
on which to speculate, and curious prosecutors are left to wonder
whether, on their own, injuries leading to difficulty with eating or
paddling would be sufficient to proceed on a charge of first-degree
assault. However, in the least, one can see the benefit of the catchall category when facing a case involving a complex multiple-injury
assault. Rather than seeing a set or series of fifth-degree or thirddegree assaults, a prosecutor can charge a defendant with a single
count of first-degree assault.
Perhaps this is the singular
162
justification for the category anyway.

160. 510 N.W.2d 202, 202 (Minn. 1993).
161. Id. (citations omitted); see also State v. Sconiers, No. CX-96-1140, 1997
WL 118247, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 1997) (citing Barner and noting that
“courts have found ‘other serious bodily harm’ under the statute where a victim’s
injuries were extensive and severe”).
162. Anecdotally, prosecutors of child abuse also occasionally seek to utilize
this category when reviewing assault cases involving head injuries to infants that,
thanks to prompt medical intervention, did not create “a high probability of
death” or easily identifiable “permanent or protracted loss or impairment” but
nonetheless shock the conscience and warrant maximum prosecution. As it is
defined, “great bodily harm” does not distinguish overtly between an adult’s
injuries and an infant’s injuries, but, given the looseness in the definition of “great
bodily harm,” the issue of whether significant head trauma to an infant is “other
serious bodily harm” is not clear. Thus, there is room for prosecutorial discretion
to charge such a case. And, if a prosecutor charges the case and a district court
judge signs a complaint for first-degree assault, the great-bodily-harm element
simply will be left to lay jurors as a question of fact. Under this scenario, there
exists the potential for inconsistent outcomes of similarly situated defendants.
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V. WISCONSIN
Following a discussion of the Minnesota assault-statute regime,
Wisconsin’s regime should be familiar territory. Like Minnesota,
Wisconsin’s Criminal Code has three levels of assault, which differ
only in regard to three levels of injury suffered by the victim, and
those levels of injury are called “bodily harm,” “substantial bodily
163
harm,” and “great bodily harm.”
Assaults causing “bodily harm”
are misdemeanors, and assaults causing either “substantial” or
164
“great bodily harm” are felonies. Also, Minnesota and Wisconsin
share almost identical definitions of “bodily harm” and “great
165
bodily harm.”
With all of this similarity, what is so special about
our neighbors to the east? It is their definition of “substantial
bodily harm,” which gets rid of all of the tea-leaf reading and talk of
“temporary but substantial” injuries.
A.

Wisconsin’s “Substantial Bodily Harm”

In its definition of “substantial bodily harm,” the Wisconsin
legislature created a list of qualifying injuries that it wanted to be
considered sufficient for a felony charge.
In Wisconsin,
“substantial bodily harm” means “bodily injury that causes a
laceration which requires stitches, staples, or a tissue adhesive; any
fracture of a bone; a broken nose; a burn; a petechia; a temporary
loss of consciousness, sight or hearing; a concussion; or a loss or
166
fracture of a tooth.”
Rather than using the “temporary but substantial” language
163. WIS. STAT. ANN § 940.19 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Act 286). The only
minor nuance is that, in cases in which a victim suffers great bodily harm, if the
state can prove that the defendant intended to cause great bodily harm, then he will be
punished more severely than if the state can prove only than he intended to cause
mere bodily harm. Compare id. § 940.19(4), with id. § 940.19(5).
164. Id. § 940.19.
165. Compare id. § 939.22(4), (14), with MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 7–8
(2012). One particular case illustrates that the bar for “bodily harm” presumably
is as low as Minnesota’s. In State v. Higgs, the defendant threw urine in the victim’s
eyes, “causing a burning and stinging sensation.” 601 N.W.2d 653, 660 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1999). The court determined that the victim’s description of the sensation
she felt was “pain” and thus “bodily harm.” Id.
166. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.22(38) (Westlaw). It is noteworthy that the
legislature specifically includes two disfiguring injuries not previously discussed in
this article: burns and petechia. The addition of petechial hemorrhaging
occurred only within the past decade. See Act of Mar. 20, 2008, sec. 3,
§ 939.22(38), 2007 Wis. Acts 127, 127 (amending the statutory definition of
“substantial bodily harm” in section 939.22 (38) to include a petechia).
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found in Minnesota’s definition of “substantial bodily harm” and
asking prosecutors and jurors to figure out whether an injury fits
under the statute, Wisconsin eliminates that interpretive step. By
“cutting out the middle man,” Wisconsin makes the mathematics
easier and less subject to ambiguity and misinterpretation.
The benefits should be immediately obvious. Instead of
fiddling with whether a particular laceration should qualify as
“temporary but substantial disfigurement,” the Wisconsin
legislature simply lists that any laceration that requires stitches,
staples, or a tissue adhesive is “substantial bodily harm.” In
Minnesota, it is common for prosecutors to believe that a laceration
that requires stitches is “substantial bodily harm,” to charge a case
on that belief, and to proceed to trial with that belief. However, as
the statute and case law stand, the prosecutor still must argue that
such a laceration fits the words “temporary but substantial
disfigurement,” and a defense attorney still can argue that it is not.
And any individual juror can decide on his or her own that the
injury is not substantial enough, causing a hung jury or acquittal.
167
There is no need for such looseness in the joints.
Wisconsin’s
statute fixes this problem.
Other benefits to Wisconsin’s definition of “substantial bodily
harm” are apparent. Instead of requiring a jury to figure out what
“loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
167. Anecdotally, in a Hennepin County District Court trial in the summer of
2012, a skilled and experienced colleague of mine tried a third-degree assault case
in which the victim was whacked in the forehead with a skateboard and suffered a
laceration that required several stitches to repair. In closing argument, and for
the first time in the proceeding, defense counsel argued that the laceration was
not “substantial disfigurement.” In rebuttal, the prosecutor was left with little
response beyond visually displaying displeasure at defense counsel’s challenge to a
belief that virtually all criminal-law practitioners in Minnesota ascribe. In terms of
what was said to the jury, however, she was left to say only “Yes, it is!” and run
through the definition of substantial bodily harm. There were no other pertinent
elements of the offense at issue. After deliberation, the jury found the defendant
not guilty. Obviously, despite the tea leaves left by the unpublished laceration
cases cited above, there is nothing in statute or case law to help determine that an
injury indeed should be considered substantial bodily harm or not. The jurors
were left to work through what should be deemed “substantial” for themselves,
which seems oddly subjective and arbitrary. Inviting a jury to evaluate credibility is
one thing, and jurors do a marvelous job at it. But, why should they be asked to
determine whether a laceration that requires stitches to repair should be ascribed
the adjective “substantial”? Presumably, all parties, including the defendant, the
court, defense counsel, the jury, and the prosecutor, would have preferred to see
the issue resolved earlier in the process, most obviously via clearer, additional
legislative guidance.
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organ” means, the Wisconsin legislature specifies what the areas of
concern are: loss of consciousness, sight, and hearing.
Additionally, by specifically listing “concussion” as a form of
“substantial bodily harm,” one may assume the legislature is
referring to impairment of brain function, which is how
168
concussions typically are defined and described.
The Wisconsin
statute demystifies “substantial bodily harm” and makes the
mathematics obvious and clinical, as it should be.
Another benefit is that, instead of using the term “fracture of
any bodily member,” the Wisconsin legislature uses several terms to
clarify what it deems substantial injury: (1) fracture of a bone, (2)
broken nose, or (3) loss or fracture of a tooth. Bone fractures and
broken noses are considered “substantial bodily harm” in
Minnesota, but Wisconsin clears up the issue of teeth. The statute
clarifies that Wisconsin refuses to distinguish between a fracture of
a tooth and fracture of a bone, and it specifies that a loss of a tooth
should not be considered “great bodily harm.” So, on the issue of
tooth loss, Wisconsin diverges from Minnesota, perhaps
appropriately, by treating the injury less seriously. But the statute
brings clarity, and it avoids the legal-issue/fact-issue problem
identified in the Moore decision previously discussed. Jurors in
Wisconsin are not left having to play “connect-the-dots,” as they are
in Minnesota.
B.

Wisconsin’s “Great Bodily Harm”

Wisconsin has not modified its definition of “great bodily
harm” to list specific injuries; it retains the same language
embraced by the MPC over fifty years ago. Indeed, given the age of
the statute, it should be no surprise that the hand-wringing over the
concept of “great bodily harm” has taken place a few times since
Wisconsin implemented its modern assault-statute regime in the
169
1950s. Just like in Minnesota, the issue of what constitutes “great
bodily harm” typically arises in Wisconsin on sufficiency-of-theevidence claims, and, just like in Minnesota, the Wisconsin courts
170
have struggled finding the demarcation line.
The Wisconsin
168. See, e.g., State v. McKague, 246 P.3d 558, 564–66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011)
(discussing concussions and holding that a concussion on its own, absent loss of
consciousness, rose to the level of substantial bodily harm under Washington law).
169. See State v. Bronston, 97 N.W.2d 504, 507 (Wis. 1959) (discussing changes
in Wisconsin’s aggravated battery statute).
170. See, e.g., id. at 506–07. Here, the court was asked to review the sufficiency
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Court of Appeals explicitly conceded that point in 1999, when it
stated, “‘it is not easy as a matter of law to draw the line of
demarcation between “great bodily harm” and other levels of
171
bodily harm.’”
The court acknowledged that, given the current
statutory definition of “great bodily harm,” the issue of whether an
injury constitutes “great bodily harm” must “fall into a twilight zone”
172
of jury fact-finding and deliberation.
In other words, the court
acknowledged that, as part of the judicial branch, it can only
interpret the words of the statute; it cannot complete the
purportedly mysterious fact-finding chore with which lay jurors are
173
tasked.
There is little value in running through more case law from
Wisconsin to illustrate that its appellate courts have struggled with
placing certain injuries on either side of the “great bodily harm”
dividing line. They appear to have had the same problems with
interpretation and inconsistency that Minnesota has had and
should now try to avoid.
Fortunately, the examination of Wisconsin’s assault-statute
regime points to a proposal on how to improve the situation in
Minnesota.
VI. PROPOSAL
The discussion in Part IV of this article supports the notion
that, in Minnesota, there is a lack of clarity in the definitions of
“substantial bodily harm” and “great bodily harm.” Given the lack
of clarity, there is too great a potential for confusion, arbitrary
interpretation, unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants,
of the evidence supporting an aggravated-battery (equivalent to first-degree
assault) conviction involving a victim who was struck on the head by the defendant
with a wrench, causing a two-inch scalp laceration, causing her to be hospitalized
for a few hours, and causing her headaches and pain in the jaw for some time after
the assault. Reviewing the testimony, the court observed that the victim testified
that she no longer had pain. The court acknowledged that its state’s new statute
“is not concerned with the potentialities of the offender’s act but only with its end
result.” Id. at 508. It swiftly noted that, because the victim no longer felt pain, she
did not suffer “permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the
victim did not suffer great bodily harm.
171. State v. Rodriguez, No. 2008AP2520-CR, 2010 WL 94032, at *3 (Wis. Ct.
App. Jan. 12, 2010) (quoting State v. Flores, 250 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Wis. 1977)).
172. Id. (quoting Flores, 250 N.W.2d at 724) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
173. See id. at *2, *4.
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and injustice. The discussion in Part V of the Wisconsin statutory
regime points to a way to reduce the potential for confusion.
This article presents a simple proposal: in short, the Minnesota
legislature should either adopt the explicit language used in
Wisconsin’s definition of “substantial bodily harm” or at least follow
its approach in identifying the specific injuries that should be
covered under the term. Doing so would clear up many of the
confusions discussed in Part IV, and it would allow prosecutors to
make easier and more consistent charging decisions. Certainly, this
change is not intended to benefit just prosecutors. Doing so may
save a defendant from being charged with a felony offense. It also
would save jurors from having to make the difficult evaluations of
injuries in their deliberation rooms, which indeed should be less
mysterious places than the “twilight zone.” Thus, there are
multiple reasons why modifying the statute would be just and serve
multiple beneficiaries.
The Minnesota legislature also should follow this approach in
adopting a new definition of “great bodily harm.” It is evident that
this has not been done in Wisconsin to date, but the Minnesota
legislature should not conclude that it would be impossible to craft
a definition of “great bodily harm” that would provide more clarity
to practitioners. Indeed, even if the legislature broke down the
definition in the form of a simpler list, the potential for confusion
could be minimized. The list could begin with fairly noncontroversial types of bodily injuries, including injuries that:
1. Create a high probability of death;
2. Cause the permanent loss of any bodily member or organ; or
3. Cause the permanent or protracted loss of the function of any
bodily member or organ, such as hearing, chewing, eating,
and breathing.
These are three categories which are fairly straightforward and
which, according to the review of appellate decisions above, appear
to have involved far fewer confusions and controversies. The
addition of the non-exclusive list of bodily functions in the third
category is intended to help clarify the class of bodily functions
which, if lost, would constitute “great bodily harm.”
The legislature would then need to determine how to clarify
the concept of “serious permanent disfigurement.” This article
proposes the following language:
4. Prominent scarring or other permanent disfigurement of the
skin.
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The new term used in the proposed language, of course, is
“prominent,” which was selected because the Minnesota appellate
174
courts have used the concept in this context for decades.
The
word “prominence” has a number of definitions, but it typically
refers to items which stand out, which are easily seen, which are
175
conspicuous, which are particularly noticeable, etc.
Looking at
the cases cited in Part IV, it is clear that what the legislature is
concerned about is disfigurement that tends to (1) cause victims to
change their behavior to avoid exposure to others and/or (2) make
victims feel considerable embarrassment or shame when their
disfigurement is visible to others. The concept of “prominence”
addresses both of these concerns. This language could assist
prosecutors, jurors, and appellate courts in determining what types
of scars should be counted as “great bodily harm.” While this
category still does not involve a cut-and-dry, explicit description of
specific qualifying injuries, when appellate litigation arises
involving this new statutory language, there would be a more
workable definition for the appellate courts to explicate and to apply
to disparate factual scenarios involving scars.
Lastly, the Minnesota legislature should find a way to modify
the catch-all category of “other serious bodily harm.” This article
proposes the following replacement:
5. Two separate and distinct injuries, each of which constitutes
substantial bodily harm, arising from the same course of
conduct.
As the reader may recall, a review of the case law suggests that
the category of “other serious bodily harm” is treated mainly as a
repository for complex multi-injury assaults. There does not
appear to be any specific appellate case in which an individual
injury was not covered by the other categories of “great bodily
harm” but was deemed to fit exclusively in the category of “other
serious bodily harm.” In the cases which discussed “other serious
bodily harm,” there were victims who had received multiple
injuries, more than one of which individually constitutes
“substantial bodily harm,” and it seemed apparent that the amount
of harm caused by the defendants in those cases justified charging
and convicting them of an offense more serious than assault in the
174. See, e.g., State v. Moua, No. A11-944, 2012 WL 2505744, at *4 (Minn. Ct.
App. July 2, 2012); State v. McDaniel, 534 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
175. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1403
(4th ed. 2009) (defining “prominent”).
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third degree. The language chosen above would address that type
of case.
The language chosen, while broad enough to cover complex
assaults, is intended to provide two limitations. First, the two
injuries must be significantly different. For example, it would not
allow a prosecutor to charge first-degree assault for an assault
involving two fractured ribs received in the same assault. In such a
case, two fractured ribs would not be distinct. Second, the two
injuries would have to derive from one assaultive incident. For
example, this category of harm would not allow a prosecutor to
charge first-degree assault if, on one day, the defendant fractured
the victim’s rib and, the next day, broke his nose. Such a situation
would constitute two separate assaults. Also, it would not allow a
prosecutor to charge first-degree assault if a defendant punched a
victim once in the face, knocking him unconscious and causing a
laceration that required stitches to repair. Those two injuries,
although distinct, are not separate from each other; they were
176
caused by a single voluntary act.
Taking account of these five proposed categories of “great
bodily harm,” it appears that almost all of the injuries that currently
are considered “great bodily harm” would remain covered.
However, the new language would be clearer, more helpful, and
more objective. Surely, there would be issues to resolve if this
statutory regime is adopted. However, this article’s intent is not to
present a complete piece of legislation or a complete defense of
the proposal that has been sketched; it is to identify a problem and
to point toward a potential solution.
VII. CONCLUSION
The task of making a charging decision in a felony-assault case
is not one that any ethical prosecutor takes lightly. One would
hope that the charging decisions that prosecutors make would be
easy and mathematical, but charging decisions rarely are, as not
every aspect of a case is reducible to presenting an accurate map or
solving an algebraic equation. Nevertheless, this article has looked
at Minnesota’s assault-statute regime and pointed to a problem that
makes charging decisions potentially more subjective and arbitrary
176. Alternatively, if a suspect knocked a victim unconscious and then kicked
the victim in the ribs, causing a fracture, the prosecutor would have the discretion
to consider charging assault in the first degree.
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than they should or need to be. Specifically, the article has
discussed the concepts of “substantial bodily harm” and “great
bodily harm,” which are the defining, distinguishing concepts in
Minnesota’s felony assault statutes. There is little justification for
why these concepts are as unclear as they are. This article presents
the hope that, with a modest amount of legislative change, the
charging of felony assaults can become a little bit more
mathematical.
Ideally, evaluating whether an injury in a new case is
tantamount to “substantial bodily harm” or “great bodily harm”
would require only some sort of “box-checking.” In contrast to the
ideal, as this article reveals, the current definitions of these terms
complicate and often prevent simple categorization of an injury.
This article has presented reasons and examples intended to
compel the reader to believe that the Minnesota legislature should
improve and clarify the definitions of “substantial bodily harm” and
“great bodily harm.”
This article has proposed modifying Minnesota’s definition of
“substantial bodily harm” by adopting Wisconsin’s definition
because Wisconsin clearly specifies a list of injuries. Adopting
Wisconsin’s definition would be helpful to all practitioners, jurors,
and defendants, and it would make the criminal justice system
more just. This change also would continue to build on the
element-analysis philosophy and goals of the MPC.
This article has proposed modifying Minnesota’s definition of
“great bodily harm” by trying to make a clearer and more explicit
list of the types of injuries which should be included. The exact
proposal in the article does not present a radical change to the
current regime, except that it attempts to provide a clearer
definition of the type of permanent disfigurement that should be
considered “great bodily harm.” It also dispenses with the category
of “other serious bodily harm” by creating a category that can be
used when victims receive multiple substantial injuries in the same
assaultive incident.
These statutory modifications should improve the ease and
consistency in the charging of felony assault cases, and they have
the potential for increasing justice and fairness for defendants and
for the public. These changes are ones which hopefully all
conscientious practitioners, legislators, and citizens would support.
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